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DETERMINANTS OF FINANCIAL DISTRESS IN LARGE 
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS: EVIDENCE FROM U.S. BANK 
HOLDING COMPANIES 
I INTRODUCTION 
In recent years many large U.S. financial institutions have failed or came close to 
failing due to their lending practices and trading behaviour (Allen, Babus and Carletti, 
2009; Laeven, 2011). Such failures have triggered a sharp contraction in both 
advanced and emerging economies, and the government rescues associated with these 
failures have given rise to substantial fiscal costs (Laeven and Valencia, 2012). These 
events highlight the critical importance of understanding the determinants of financial 
distress of large financial institutions in the promotion of financial stability.  
Studies of financial stability tend to belong to one of two highly related areas of 
research: bank default/insolvency risk, and the effect of various factors on bank risk 
taking. Default/insolvency risk is the uncertainty surrounding a firm’s ability to serve 
its debts and obligations (Crosbie and Kocagil, 2003). There are two commonly used 
measures to detect default/insolvency risk: the Distance-to-Default (DD) and Z-Score 
measures (Miller, 2009), both of which are negatively related to financial distress. 
Meanwhile, the recent 2007-2009 financial crisis has given rise to a plethora of 
studies investigating the various determining factors on bank failure or bank risk 
taking, including Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2010), Houston et al. (2010), 
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Beltratti and Stulz (2012), Cole and White (2012), Berger and Bouwman (2013), and 
Berger, Imbierowicz, and Rauch (2014). 
Recent studies such as Avraham, Selvaggi and Vickery (2012) suggest that almost 
all U.S. banking assets are controlled by bank holding companies (BHCs). Therefore, 
it would be helpful for academia, practitioners and financial regulators to have a deep 
understanding of financial stability when examining the determinants of large 
financial institutions’ default risk with reference to BHCs. However, despite the 
advanced stage of research on various aspects of BHCs
1
, few studies investigate what 
drives financial distress of BHCs, and the implications for financial regulation. 
In this paper, we use a sample of 629 selected BHCs with 15503 observations of 
firm-quarters from 2003Q1 to 2013Q4 to investigate the effects of various factors on 
financial distress in terms of default risk in large U.S. BHCs. We use both the DD and 
the Z-Score as dependent variables to predict financial distress. To detect various 
determining factors derived from the literature in the field in both crisis times and 
normal times, we follow Berger and Bouwman (2013) in their formal definition of the 
recent 2007-2009 financial crisis. As a result, our sample is divided into three periods 
based on Berger and Bouwman (2013): before the crisis, i.e. 2003Q1-2007Q2; during 
                                                          
1
 Recent studies of the general issue of BHCs can be found, for example, in Avraham, Selvaggi and 
Vickery (2012), Copeland (2012), Cetorelli, Mandel and Mollineaux (2012) and Adams and Mehran 
(2003). Other studies that examine a variety of aspects of BHCs include Ashcraft’s (2008) investigation 
of whether bank holding companies are a source of strength to their banking subsidiaries. Curry, Fissel 
and Hanweck (2008) assess whether BHC risk ratings are asymmetrically assigned or biased over the 
business cycles. Elyasiani and Wang (2010) examine the relation between asymmetry of BHCs and 
their non-interest income diversification. Cornett, McNutt and Tehranian (2009) probe the impact of 
corporate governance on earnings management in the U.S. BHCs. Studies on BHC diversification 
include Elyasiani and Wang (2012) and Goetz, Laeven and Levine (2013). 
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the crisis, i.e. 2007Q3-2009Q4; and after the crisis, i.e. 2010Q1-2013Q4. We apply 
our empirical model to test our hypotheses for each of the three periods separately. 
Our main findings are as follow: (1) The housing price index is always a 
statistically significant determinant and is positively associated with both the DD and 
the Z-Score before, during and after the recent financial crisis, implying that as a 
proxy for a pro-cyclical macroeconomic condition, a sharp decline in house prices 
may tend to drive financial distress. (2) Of our two selected measures of BHC risk 
characteristic, the non-performing loan ratio is the most powerful indicator predicting 
default/insolvency risk among all the selected independent variables before, during 
and after the crisis, while the other measure, short-term wholesale funding, can be 
considered a reliable default risk indicator, particularly when using DD to predict 
financial distress. (3) Concerning the two alternative measures of BHC activity 
diversification, i.e. non-interest income and off-balance-sheet activities, non-interest 
income (NIN) has a directly positive effect on insolvency risk within all selected 
periods when using Z-Score to predict financial distress, while when using DD as the 
dependent variable, we find the negative effect of NIN on default risk only during the 
crisis time; off-balance-sheet activity has a directly negative impact on Z-Score only 
before the crisis, whereas it has a negative impact on DD after the crisis, and no 
impact on DD or Z-Score during the crisis. (4) Of the three measures of regulatory 
capital requirement, i.e. Tier I leverage ratio, Tier I capital ratio, and Tier 1 risk-based 
capital ratio, all have a directly positive impact on both DD and Z-Score only after the 
crisis, i.e. 2010Q1-2013Q4. 
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Furthermore, because of data permission, we add an important corporate 
governance variable, institutional ownership, into our main econometric model to 
conduct a robustness test as our additional analysis, based on the recent trend whereby 
many studies suggest that corporate governance plays an important role in bank risk 
taking (see such as Laeven and Levine, 2009; Pathan, 2009; Erkens, Huang and Matos, 
2012; Beltratti and Stulz, 2012; Berger, Imbierowicz and Rauch, 2014). After adding 
this corporate governance variable, our main findings still hold. Our additional 
analysis also indicates that there is a strongly positive relationship between 
institutional ownership and both the DD and the Z-Score during the crisis time, which 
is contradictory to the previous evidence reported in Laeven and Levine (2009) and 
Ellul and Yerramilli (2013) that banks with more institutional ownership take more 
risk. We argue that a possible explanation for our results on institutional ownership 
may be that during crisis periods institutional shareholders are always prudent and 
reluctant to take more risks. Hence, if they are willing to take on more shareholdings 
of a certain BHC during the crisis, this risk-taking action seems to imply that these 
institutional shareholders think the BHC in which they are investing has a better 
financial soundness. 
Our study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, this paper extends 
the existing BHC literature, by examining various determining factors on 
default/insolvency risk of large U.S. BHCs using both the DD and the Z-Score 
separately as our dependent variables for predicting financial distress in the selected 
periods: before, during, and after the crisis. Second, as detailed in part C of Section 5, 
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our main finding can provide some implications for financial regulation, which can 
help us to thoroughly understand, and evaluate, current policies such as the 
Dodd-Frank Act of 2010. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the 
literature on bank risk. Section 3 develops the hypotheses that we will examine and 
specifies our econometric formulation. Section 4 discusses the data and provides 
conventional descriptive statistics. Section 5 presents the empirical findings, conducts 
additional analysis and identifies possible policy implications. Section 6 concludes. 
II THE BANK RISK LITERATURE 
Studies investigating bank default/insolvency risk and the effect of various 
factors on bank risk taking have been well documented. The two commonly used 
measures to detect default/insolvency risk for predicting financial distress are 
Distance-to-Default (DD) and the Z-Score. The DD is a market-based measure for 
gauging how far a firm is away from default, originally derived from the models of 
Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1974). These original models have been 
extended to investigate various bankruptcy-related problems (for recent review 
studies, see Sundaresan, 2000; Jarrow, 2009; Sundaresan 2013). The Z-Score, as an 
alternative measure, explicitly compares buffers, i.e. capitalization, and returns and 
risk, i.e. volatility of returns, to detect a bank’s insolvency risk. A higher Z-Score 
denotes greater stability of the bank. Studies employing the Z-Score measure to 
investigate bank stability include Boyd and Runkle (1993), Berger, Klapper and 
6 
 
Turk-Ariss (2009), Laeven and Levine (2009), Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2010), 
Houston et al. (2010) and Beltratti and Stulz (2012). 
The recent financial crisis triggered a series of studies that investigate the effect 
of various factors on bank risk taking. For example, Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga 
(2010) employ a sample of 1,334 banks from 101 countries before the 2008 financial 
crisis to investigate the effect of bank activity and short-term funding strategies on 
bank risk and return. They find international evidence that banks that rely heavily on 
non-interest income and non-deposit funding activities tend to be very risky. Based on 
a sample of nearly 2,400 banks from 69 countries, Houston et al. (2010) investigate 
the relationship among creditor rights, information sharing and bank risk taking. Their 
findings show that stronger creditor rights enhance the probability of financial risk, 
and that information sharing can be helpful not only to improve bank profitability and 
economic growth, but also to lower bank risk and the probability of financial crisis. 
Based on a sample of large banks across the world during the period 2007-2008, 
Beltratti and Stulz (2012) investigate the determinants of bank performance, finding 
that the better-performing banks had less leverage and lower returns immediately 
before the crisis. Cole and White (2012) investigate the determinants of U.S. 
commercial bank failures during the recent financial crisis, and find that the 
CAMELS
2
 components and measures of commercial real estate investments play an 
important role in causing the bank failures that occurred during 2009. After formally 
                                                          
2
 CAMELS is an acronym for Capital adequacy; Asset quality; Management; Earnings; Liquidity, and 
Sensitivity to market risk. 
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defining the 2007-2009 financial crisis in the US, Berger and Bouwman (2013) 
investigate the effect of capital on a bank’s performance. Their results show that, for 
small banks, capital can help them to improve their market share and probability of 
survival at all times; and for medium and large banks, capital can improve their 
performance mainly during financial crisis. 
However, recent studies such as Avraham, Selvaggi and Vickery (2012) suggest 
that as almost all U.S. banking assets are controlled by bank holding companies 
(BHCs), it would be helpful for us to gain a deep understanding of financial stability 
if we are to examine the determinants of large financial institutions’ default risk from 
a BHC perspective. Although various issues regarding BHCs have been researched, 
there are few studies examining the determinants of default risk in BHCs, a very 
important issue that can provide critical insights on how to improve the regulation of a 
key segment of the financial sector. In this light, we investigate the effects of various 
factors driving the movements of distance-to-default as proxy for default risk to find 
the determinants of financial distress in large U.S. BHCs. 
III HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT AND MODEL SPECIFICATION 
A. Hypothesis Development 
Based on the literature in the field, we construct the following four hypotheses: 
1. The Business Cycle Hypothesis (H1): As a pro-cyclical macroeconomic factor, 
housing prices are positively related to both the DD and the Z-Score of BHCs. 
In this hypothesis, the default risk is associated with the macroeconomic state of 
the economy. Following Blundell-Wignall and Roulet (2012), we use housing prices 
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as the proxy. Their study shows that, in the country location of the assessed bank, 
housing prices have the property to capture business cycles driving asset prices.  
2. Risk Characteristic Hypothesis (H2): Indicators of BHC risk characteristics such 
as the non-performing loan ratio and short-term wholesale funding are negatively 
related to both the DD and the Z-Score of BHCs. 
Existing studies have investigated the impact of a BHC’s risk characteristics on its 
default risk, performance, or executive compensation. Bennett et al. (2012) find that 
higher levels of non-performing assets/total asset ratio are negatively associated with 
the DD measure. Balboa, López-Espinosa and Rubia (2012) probe whether the factor 
causing increases in systemic risk in the banking industry, i.e. short-term wholesale 
funding, could arise from the desire of bank managers to increase their variable 
compensation, and find that this factor is positively related to high levels of variable 
compensation. Balboa et al. (2012) also suggest that short-term wholesale funding is 
unstable, which can be taken to imply interconnectedness among financial institutions 
and exposures to liquidity risk. In the light of these findings, our hypothesis employs 
both BHC risk characteristics, i.e. non-performing loan ratio and short-term wholesale 
funding, to investigate whether these factors can affect DD and Z-Score. 
3. Capital Requirement Hypothesis (H3): BHCs’ capital requirement measures, 
including the Tier I Risk-Based Capital Ratio, Total Risk-Based Capital Ratio, 
and the Tier I Leverage Ratio, are positively associated with both the DD and the 
Z-Score of BHCs. 
A U.S. BHC needs to report three separate capital ratios to the regulator: Tier 1 
risk-based capital ratio, Total risk-based capital ratio, and Tier I leverage ratio, 
whereby the regulator determines whether the bank is well-capitalized, adequately 
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capitalized, or under-capitalized
3
 (Kisin and Manela, 2013). In our hypothesis, we 
use these three regulatory capital ratios as the alternative capital requirements to test 
the relation between them and both the DD and the Z-Score. 
4. Activity Diversification Hypothesis (H4): The diversified activities of BHCs such 
as those reflected in non-interest income or off-balance-sheet activity are 
negatively associated with both the DD and the Z-Score of BHCs. 
Over the last two decades, the activities of financial institutions have diversified 
considerably, shifting from the traditional (borrowing and lending) toward related 
activities, e.g., proprietary trading and private OTC market-making services (Flannery, 
2012). Many studies have examined various aspects of BHC activity diversification. 
Some related studies investigate the issue of non-interest income. For example, Stiroh 
(2004) reports that between 1984 and 2001, non-interest income, i.e. the revenue 
associated with trading and advising activities, grew from 25% to 43% of total 
revenue of U.S. commercial banks. Related studies are Stiroh and Rumble (2006) and 
Brunnermeier, Dong and Palia (2012). Other researches probe the issue of banks’ 
off-balance-sheet activity. Minton, Williamson and Stulz (2005) investigate whether 
the use of credit derivatives by U.S. BHCs can reduce bank risk, and find that this 
seems not to increase the soundness of the banks involved. Li and Marinč (2013) 
assess the effect of financial derivatives on the systematic risk of publicly listed BHCs 
                                                          
3
 According to Kisin and Manela (2013), a bank is regarded as well-capitalized if both of the following 
are true: 
a. Core capital (leverage) ratio Tier 1 (core) capital as a percentage of average total assets - 
ineligible intangibles  3% to 5% depending on its composite CAMELS rating; 
b. Tier 1 risk-based capital ratio  Tier 1 (core) capital as a percentage of risk-weighted assets  6%; 
Total risk-based capital ratio  Total risk-based capital as a percent of risk-weighted assets  10%. 
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in the U.S., and find that greater use of credit derivatives reflects higher systematic 
credit risk. Deng and Elyasiani (2008) employ the ratio of notional principal on 
interest rate contracts to total assets as the measure of off-balance-sheet activity risk 
for their hypothesis testing. In our hypothesis, we use the non-interest income ratio 
and off-balance-sheet activity as alternative measures of BHC activity diversification 
to test the linkage between them and both the DD and the Z-Score. 
B. Model Specification 
 For our model specification, we first identify our dependent variable. We use the 
Distance-to-Default (DD) and Z-Score measures as our dependent variables to 
investigate default/insolvency risk of financial institutions, and apply them separately. 
For the DD measure, we use the KMV-Merton model based on Black and Scholes 
(1973) and Merton (1974). The assumption of the Merton model suggests that the 
market value of assets tA  follows a random log-normal process expressed by: 
 / ,t t A AA A t t            (1) 
where A  is the expected return and A  is the volatility of assets. According to the 
Black-Scholes pricing of call options, the value of equity tE  at any time t prior to 
the maturity can be written as: 
( )
1 2( ) ( )
r T t
t tE A N d Le N d
         (2) 
where r  is the risk-free rate, L  is the book value of the firm’s debt, and T  is 
the maturity time. The terms 1d  and 2d  are calculated by: 
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      (3) 
2 1 Ad d T t                    (4) 
 The Black-Scholes pricing in (2) can provide the linkage between the volatility of 
equity and the volatility of assets through Ito’s Lemma: 
1( )
t
E A
t
A
N d
E
 
 
  
 
      (5) 
The Merton model implies that the current value of assets 0A  and its volatility 
A  can be derived from the two equations (2) and (5) with 0t  . 
As a result, the distance-to-default (DD), the number of standard deviations away 
from the default point, can be given by: 
  20
1
ln /
2
A A
A
A L T
DD
T
 

 
  
        (6) 
A bank defaults or is bankrupt when 0DD  . 
For the Z-Score measure, we follow the related studies such as Berger, Klapper 
and Turk-Ariss (2009), Laeven and Levine (2009), and Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga 
(2010) and use the model   / ROAZScore ROA E A   , where ROA  is the return on 
assets of BHC, E A  is the equity to asset ratio and ROA  is the standard deviation 
of return on assets. 
 Next, we identify our independent variables. First, we use the U.S. housing price 
index (HPI) to examine the first hypothesis – Business Cycle Hypothesis (H1). Then, 
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we employ the natural log of the total assets of BHCs (Size), Return on Asset (ROA), 
and Loan Loss Reserves Ratio (LLRR) as another three independent variables. Next, 
we use the two important indicators showing BHC risk characteristics, i.e. the 
short-term wholesale funding ratio (STWF) and non-performing loan ratio (NPLR), as 
control variables in our testing of the second hypothesis – Risk Characteristic 
Hypothesis (H2). In addition, we use the three alternative capital requirements, i.e. the 
Tier 1 risk-based capital ratio (Tier1), Total risk-based capital ratio (TRBCR), and 
Tier I leverage ratio (LEV), to examine the third hypothesis (H3). Finally, we employ 
the two alternative measures of BHC activity diversification, i.e. the non-interest 
income ratio (NIN), and off-balance-sheet activity risk ratio (OBSA), to test the fourth 
hypothesis (H4). 
Finally, a random effects panel regression with standard errors clustered on firm 
level is used to evaluate the respective determinants of the DD and Z-Score measures. 
The empirical model is specified in the following equation: 
, , , 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 ,
5 , 6 , 7 , ,3 4
i t i t i t i t i t i t i t
i t i t i t i t
DD or ZScore HPI Size ROA STWF
NPLR H H
    
   
        
      
   (7)                                                             
where i denotes the bank and t shows the period. 
IV DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
A. Data and Variable Definitions 
Our sample selection procedure is as follows. We first select the 2900 U.S. bank 
holding companies with total assets available for the period from 2003 to 2012, as 
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listed in the FR Y-9C form
4
, the quarterly report BHCs file to the regulatory 
authorities. From these 2900 BHCs, we delete those that are private companies or are 
missing important data, which leaves a total of 629 BHCs with 15503 observations, 
i.e. BHC-quarters. The final sample is from 2003Q1 to 2013Q4, based on which we 
evaluate our empirical model before, during, and after the recent global financial 
crisis. Specifically, we follow Berger and Bouwman’s (2013) formal definition of the 
recent 2007-2009 financial crisis. As a result, our sample is divided into three periods: 
before the crisis, i.e. 2003Q1-2007Q2; during the crisis, i.e. 2007Q3-2009Q4; and 
after the crisis, i.e. 2010Q1-2013Q4. We estimate our empirical model on each of 
these periods separately. 
To calculate the DD measure, we download the daily share prices of our selected 
BHCs from 2003 to 2012 from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) 
database, the yearly debt data for that period from Compustat, and the daily risk-free 
rate over the same period from the website of the Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis. 
To calculate Z-Score, we follow Čihák et al. (2012) and calculate the standard 
deviation of ROA 
ROA  based on a five-quarter rolling time window to allow for 
sufficient variation in the denominator of Z-Score, in order to avoid the situation 
whereby the values of Z-Score are derived exclusively from variation in the levels of 
capital and profitability. Our BHC data based on FR Y-9C are downloaded from the 
                                                          
4
 FR Y-9C is a regulatory report showing Consolidated Financial Statements of Bank Holding 
Companies. Our BHC database based on FR Y-9C is downloaded from the website of the Federal 
Reserve Bank of Chicago, available at 
http://www.chicagofed.org/webpages/banking/financial_institution_reports/bhc_data.cfm 
14 
 
official website of the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago. Our data on institutional 
ownership comes from 13-F forms filed with the SEC by each institutional investor. 
Table 1 shows the variables used and their construction. All variables except 
Housing Price Index, Institutional Shareholder Percentage, Distance-to-Default, and 
Z-Score are obtained from FR Y-9C forms. In the table, the symbol within the 
brackets after each variable corresponds to the symbol shown in the regression results. 
<Table 1 here> 
B. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 displays the descriptive statistics of all variables for our selected BHCs 
during the periods: 2003Q1-2013Q4, 2003Q1-2007Q2, 2007Q2-2009Q4 and 
2010Q1-2013Q4. All descriptive results are expressed in percentage, except 
Observations, DD, Z-Score, and Size. We can see from this table that before the 
financial crisis, i.e. from 2003Q1 to 2007Q2, the maximum value of DD is 166.296, 
the mean is 15.974, and the median is 14.333; while during the crisis, i.e. from 
2007Q2 to 2009Q4, the maximum value of DD is 64.355, the mean is only 5.405, and 
the median is only 4.430. After the crisis, i.e. 2010Q1-2013Q4, the maximum value of 
DD has surged to 334.412, the mean value has gone back to 10.753, and the median is 
9.204. The sharp decrease in various values of DD from 2007Q2 to 2009Q4 indicates 
that the selected BHCs as a whole suffered drastically during the crisis. However, 
compared to DD, the values of Z-Score are much more stable before, during and after 
the crisis. The statistics of housing price index (HPI) in the three selected periods are 
highly related to those of DD. Table 2 also shows that the selected BHCs have 
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relatively stable size before, during and after the crisis. More interestingly, the 
maximum values of the three regulatory capital ratios during the crisis are generally 
higher than those before and after the crisis, whereas the mean and median values 
remain stable before, during and after the crisis. 
<Table 2 here> 
Table 3 illustrates the Correlation Matrix among all the dependent and 
independent variables used for our selected BHCs during the period 2003Q1-2013Q4. 
We can see from this table that DD is slightly positively related to its alternative 
measure Z-Score. Meanwhile, both DD and Z-Score are positively related to both the 
housing price index (HPI) and the three regulatory capital ratios, i.e. Tier I risk-based 
capital ratio (Tier I), Total risk-based capital ratio (TRBCR), and Tier I leverage ratio 
(LEV); whereas both DD and Z-Score are negatively related to Size and the two BHC 
risk characteristics, i.e. the short-term wholesale funding ratio (STWF), and the 
non-performing loan ratio (NPLR). For the two alternative measures of BHC activity 
diversification, i.e. the non-interest income ratio (NIN) and the off-balance-sheet 
activity risk ratio (OBSA), DD is positively related to the first and negatively related 
to the second, while Z-Score is positively associated with both. Institutional 
shareholding (INST) is slightly negatively related to DD but positively related to 
Z-Score. In addition, OBSA is positively related to STWF, but slightly negatively 
related to NPLR. Tier I is highly positively associated with the other two alternative 
capital requirements, i.e. TRBCR and LEV.  
<Table 3 here> 
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V EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
A. Multivariate Regression Results 
In this section, we derive the multivariate regression results for the determinants 
of both the DD and Z-Score measures predicting financial distress of the selected 
BHCs before, during and after the recent financial crisis. Table 4 shows the 
multivariate regression results before the crisis, i.e. from 2003Q1 to 2007Q2. First, for 
the DD measure, six multivariate regressions are conducted with the three alternative 
measures of regulatory capital requirements and the two alternatives of BHC activity 
diversification. From column 1 to column 3, in addition to our six control variables, 
we hold the non-interest income ratio (NIN), and run the regressions by changing the 
three alternatives of regulatory capital requirements. From column 4 to column 6, we 
hold the off-balance-sheet activity ratio (OBSA) and perform the same steps as for the 
first three columns. Second, for the Z-Score measure, we implement the same steps as 
conducted for the DD measure. The results of Z-Score are shown from column 7 to 
column 12. 
As can be seen from the results in columns 1 to 12 in Table 4, some variables, 
such as the housing price index (HPI), short-term wholesale funding (STWF), and 
non-performing loan ratio (NPLR), are statistically significant in all regressions, 
showing that HPI has a strongly positive link with the DD and Z-Score measures, 
while STWF and NPLR have strongly negative association with both the DD and 
Z-Score measures, as we expected. The statistic results of Size indicate that there 
exists a positive size effect on DD but a negative effect on Z-Score. The return on 
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assets (ROA) variable is significantly positively related to DD but shows no 
significant relationship with Z-Score. Loan Loss Reserves Ratio (LLRR) has a 
positive relation with both DD and Z-Score, but this relation is not statistically 
significant. Comparing the results of the three alternative regulatory capital 
requirements, we can see that Tier I leverage ratio is a more reliable indicator than the 
other two. For the two alternative measures of BHC activity diversification, both NIN 
and OBSA are statistically significant in the results from columns 7 to 12, showing 
their negative linkage with Z-Score, but they are not significantly related to the DD 
measure. 
<Table 4 here> 
Using the same steps as in Table 4, Tables 5 and 6 report the multivariate 
regression results during the crisis, i.e. 2007Q3-2009Q4, and after the crisis, i.e. 
2010Q1-2013Q4, respectively. During the crisis, Table 5 shows that ROA is 
statistically significant in all regression results, indicating that it has a strongly 
positive relation with both DD and Z-Score. The significant positive relation between 
NPLR and both DD and Z-Score illustrates that, as a risk characteristic of BHC, it is 
still a reliable indicator predicting financial distress. LLRR is only significantly 
positively related to the DD measure. More interestingly, NIN is significantly 
positively related to DD during the crisis, but significantly negatively related to 
Z-Score. Table 5 also indicates that OBSA is not significantly related to either DD or 
Z-Score, and that Tier I Leverage Ratio and Tier 1 Risk-Based Capital Ratio are 
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relatively more reliable indicators when we use DD as the predictor of financial 
distress. 
<Table 5 here> 
After the crisis, i.e. 2010Q1-2013Q4, Table 6 shows that HPI, as a measure of 
macroeconomic environment, is a reliable indicator predicting financial distress. ROA 
is only significantly positively related to Z-Score. NPLR is always a reliable predictor 
of financial distress. Contrary to its relation with DD during the crisis, LLRR is 
significantly negatively related to DD after the crisis. For the two alternative measures 
of BHC activity diversification, only OBSA is significantly negatively related to DD, 
while only NIN is significantly negatively related to Z-Score. All three regulatory 
capital requirements are significantly positively related to both DD and Z-Score, 
showing their strong regulatory strength after the crisis. 
<Table 6 here> 
B. Additional Analysis 
In this part, we conduct a robustness test as our additional analysis by adding an 
important corporate governance variable, i.e. institutional ownership/shareholdings. 
Recent literature has suggested that corporate governance plays an important role in 
bank risk. For example, Laeven and Levine (2009) empirically assess theories 
concerning risk taking by banks, their ownership structures, and national bank 
regulations, and suggest that banks with more powerful, diversified owners tend to be 
riskier than those banks. Pathan (2009) suggests that bank board structure is a vital 
determinant of bank risk taking, finding that strong bank boards are positively related 
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to bank risk taking. Erkens, Huang and Matos (2012) find international evidence that 
banks with more independent boards and higher institutional ownership had worse 
stock returns during the 2007-08 crisis period. Beltratti and Stulz (2012) find that 
banks with more shareholder-friendly board structures, i.e. with good governance, 
experienced drastically worse effects during the 2007-08 crisis compared with other 
banks. Berger, Imbierowicz and Rauch (2014) investigate the roles of corporate 
governance in bank defaults during the recent financial crisis, finding that 
shareholdings of lower-level management such as vice presidents are strongly 
positively related to bank default risk, whereas shareholdings of outside directors and 
chief officers do not have a direct effect on bank default risk.  
For the relationship between institutional ownership and bank risk, Saunders et al. 
(1990) suggest that banks with larger institutional shareholdings tend to take on 
higher risks. Laeven and Levine (2009) and Ellul and Yerramilli (2013) also find that 
there is a significant positive relationship between institutional ownership and 
multiple risk measures. 
We add the institutional ownership variable into the econometric model (7) to 
conduct our additional analysis before, during and after the recent financial crisis. 
Table 7 shows additional analysis results before the crisis. Comparing Table 4 and 
Table 7, the performances of HPI, ROA, STWF, NPLR, LLRR and NIN remain the 
same after the addition of institutional ownership. Also, according to the additional 
analysis results, Tier I Leverage Ratio is still the most reliable indicator among the 
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three regulatory capital requirements. The institutional ownership variable has a 
negative relation with both DD and Z-Score, but this relation is not significant. 
<Table 7 here> 
Table 8 reports additional analysis results for the period during the crisis. 
Comparing Table 5 and Table 8, the addition of institutional ownership enhances the 
negative effect of Size on Z-Score, the positive effect of OBSA on DD, and the 
positive effect of TRBCR on DD, but only weakens the negative effect of STWF on 
Z-Score. Table 8 also shows that there is a strongly positive relationship between 
institutional ownership and both DD and Z-Score during the crisis period. One 
possible interpretation of this positive relation is that institutional shareholders are 
always prudent and reluctant to take more risk during periods of crisis; therefore, if 
they are willing to hold more shareholdings of a certain BHC, this risk-taking action 
seems to indicate that these institutional shareholders believe the BHC they have 
invested in has better financial stability. 
<Table 8 here> 
Table 9 reports the additional analysis results for the period after the crisis. 
Comparing Table 6 and Table 9, the addition of institutional ownership only weakens 
the negative effect of STWF on Z-Score. Institutional ownership is negatively related 
with both DD and Z-Score, but this relation is still not significant after the crisis. 
<Table 9 here> 
C. Possible Policy Implications from our Results 
21 
 
Based on our empirical results from conducting both the main tests and the 
additional analysis for the periods before, during and after the recent financial crisis, 
we can identify several implications for financial regulation. First, the housing prices 
index (HPI) is a reliable indicator of macro-prudential risk, which is in line with the 
expectation of our first hypothesis (H1). As a result, HPI is an important factor that 
should be considered by monetary policy and macro-prudential policy, as shown in 
Blundell-Wignall and Roulet (2012). Therefore, soundness of macroeconomic 
environment is helpful for promoting financial stability. 
Second, in response to our second hypothesis (H2) by investigating the two 
important BHC risk characteristics, our empirical results show that the 
non-performing loan ratio (NPLR) is the most powerful indicator of 
default/insolvency risk among all the selected independent variables. This implies that 
it is vital for banks or BHCs to carry out internal consolidation to improve their asset 
quality to avoid possible default/insolvency risk. However, the Dodd-Frank Act of 
2010, the latest financial sector regulation established after the recent crisis, does not 
formulate any provision on how to efficiently manage non-performing loans. 
Therefore, it seems that related policy actions are called for in the future. On the other 
hand, short-term wholesale funding (STWF), a variable strongly related to 
interconnectedness and liquidity risk exposure, can be considered a reliable default 
risk indicator, particularly when using DD to predict financial distress. Acharya and 
Richardson (2012) and Greenwood and Scharfstein (2013) suggest that STWF is an 
important factor reflecting shadow banking and systemic risk. Acharya and 
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Richardson (2012) further argue that, although some provisions within the 
Dodd-Frank Act relate to shadow banking, overall the Act does not efficiently address 
how to regulate the shadow banking sector. 
Third, with regard to activity diversification risk, our two diversity measures do 
not show the same effect on determining default risk, which responses our fourth 
hypothesis (H4). When using Z-Score to predict financial distress, non-interest 
income (NIN) has a directly positive effect on insolvency risk within all selected 
periods, which is consistent with the prediction of studies such as Stiroh (2004) and 
Stiroh and Rumble (2006). When using DD as dependent variable, we find the 
negative effect of NIN on default risk only during the crisis time, which is contrary to 
the prediction of previous studies. However, recent studies such as Köhler (2013) 
indicate that the impact of NIN on risk hinges on the business mode of a bank. 
Specifically, Köhler (2013) suggests that banks with a retail-oriented business mode 
become significantly more stable with the increase in their share of NIN; whereas 
investment-oriented banks become significantly less stable. Thus, it seems from our 
results that the positive relationship between NIN and DD during the crisis shows the 
complexity of our examined BHCs. On the other hand, off-balance-sheet activity 
(OBSA) as a potential factor for detecting bank default risk does not perform 
consistently within our selected periods. OBSA has a directly negative impact on 
Z-Score only before the crisis, while it has a negative impact on DD after the crisis, 
and no impact on either DD or Z-Score during the crisis. However, based on their 14 
OECD-country evidence, Karim et al. (2013) suggest that OBSA contributed 
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significantly to the probability of crisis after 2003. Indeed, the Dodd-Frank Act 
considers the diversified activities of banks or BHCs. For example, the Act calls for 
more stringent prudential standards for systemically important financial institutions 
(SIFIs), by considering additional standards based on the off-balance-sheet exposures 
of banks or BHCs (Acharya and Richardson, 2012). 
Fourth, for regulatory capital requirements, we obtain an interesting result. All 
three measures of capital requirements have a directly positive impact on both DD 
and Z-Score only after the crisis, i.e. 2010Q1-2013Q4, which is in accordance with 
the prediction of our third hypothesis (H3). This significant result seems to be 
consistent with the related policy actions after the crisis. For example, in 2010-2011 
the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision introduced the Basel III regulations, in 
which both capital requirements and leverage ratio have been updated to be more 
stringent. The Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 also enhanced capital requirements for SIFIs. 
However, there is ongoing debate as to whether capital requirements alone are the 
best tool for managing systemic risk for financial institutions. For example, while 
studies such as Admati et al. (2010) and Duffie (2012) suggest that only capital 
requirements can manage the systemic risk of banks, Acharya and Richardson (2012) 
imply that both capital requirements and restrictions on asset holdings (e.g. using the 
Volcker rule within the Dodd-Frank Act) can effectively manage the systemic risk of 
financial institutions. 
VI Conclusions 
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In this paper, we use a sample of 629 bank holding companies in the U.S. to 
probe the impact of various factors on the financial distress of BHCs, before, during 
and after the recent financial crisis. Our main findings are: First, the housing price 
index is consistently significant and is positively associated with the DD and the 
Z-Score measures. Second, the non-performing loan ratio is the most powerful 
indicator predicting financial distress, and short-term wholesale funding can also be 
considered a reliable default risk indicator. Third, although existing studies have 
shown that the two alternative measures of BHC activity diversification are very 
important factors affecting default risk, in this study no conclusive findings have been 
reached regarding their role as determinants of default risk. Fourth, all three measures 
of regulatory capital requirements have a directly positive impact on both DD and 
Z-Score from 2010Q1 to 2013Q4, showing their importance in the post-crisis period. 
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Table 1 Variable Names and Construction 
 
     Notes: The listed variables are used in our empirical study. All variables except the Housing Price Index, Institutional Shareholder Percentage, Distance-to-Default, 
and Z-Score are taken from FR Y-9C forms. FR Y-9C is a regulatory report showing Consolidated Financial Statements of Bank Holding Companies. Our BHC 
data based on FR Y-9C are downloaded from the official website of the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago. Our data on institutional ownership comes from 13-F 
forms filed by each institutional investors with the SEC. The symbol within the brackets after each variable corresponds to the symbol shown in the regression 
results. 
Variable FR Y-9C Data Item or Sources
Alternative Regulatory Captial
Tier I Leverage Ratio (T1Lev) BHCK7204
Tier I Risk-Based Capital Ratio (T1Cap) BHCK7206
Total Risk-Based Capital Ratio (TRBCR) BHCK7205
Alternative Bank Activity Diversification
Non Interest Income Ratio (NIN) BHCK4079/(BHCK4079+BHCK4107)
Off-Balance Sheet Activity Ratio (OSBA) (BHCK3809+BHCK8766+BHCK8767)/BHCK2170
Control Variables
House Price Index (HPI)
All-Transactions House Price Index for the United States, downloaded from
http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/USSTHPI/
Size (Size) ln(BHCK2170)
Return on Assets (ROA) BHCK4340/BHCK2170
Short-Term Wholesale Funding (STWF) (BHCK2309+BHCK3353+BHCK2332+BHDMA243)/BHCK2170
Non-Performing Loan Ratio (NPLR) (BHCK5525+BHCK5526)/BHCK2170*100
Loan Loss Reserve Ratio (LLRR) BHCK4230/BHCK3516
Institutional Shareholding (INST) Institutional shareholding calculated from 13F
Dependent Variable
Distance-to-Default (DD) Derived from equations from (1) to (6)
Z-Score (ZScore) (ROA+BHCK3210/BHCK2170)/sd(ROA)
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Table 2 Descriptive Statistics 
 
       Notes: This table shows the descriptive statistics of all dependent and independent variables for our selected BHCs, during the periods: 2003Q1-2013Q4, 
2003Q1-2007Q2, 2007Q3-2009Q4, and 2010Q1-2013Q4. The variable construction can be found in Table 1. The DD measure (DD) and the Z-Score 
measure (ZScore) are the two dependent variables. The housing price index (HPI), size (Size), return on assets (ROA), short-term wholesale funding 
Variable DD ZScore HPI Size ROA STWF NPLR LLRR NIN OSBA T1Lev T1Cap TRBCR INST
Obs 15503 15503 15503 15503 15503 15503 15503 15503 15503 15503 15503 15503 15503 13899
Mean 12.180 3.392 0.577 14.672 0.004 0.082 0.012 0.005 0.187 0.291 9.527 12.857 14.448 0.315
Std. Dev. 9.44 0.80 1.73 1.64 0.01 0.08 0.02 0.01 0.14 2.57 7.51 9.07 10.95 0.24
Min -2.730 -4.758 -3.072 11.940 -0.085 0.000 0.000 -0.024 -1.839 0.000 -3.510 -2.660 -2.660 0.000
Median 10.872 3.430 0.851 14.261 0.004 0.062 0.006 0.002 0.160 0.000 8.960 11.790 13.320 0.255
Max 334.412 7.351 3.810 21.594 0.194 0.706 0.192 0.201 0.993 52.720 793.000 843.000 1155.000 3.461
Obs 7801 7801 7801 7801 7801 7801 7801 7801 7801 7801 7801 7801 7801 6721
Mean 15.974 3.403 1.909 14.434 0.006 0.079 0.005 0.002 0.185 0.179 9.271 12.545 14.094 0.259
Std. Dev. 8.883 0.456 0.892 1.601 0.006 0.076 0.006 0.003 0.125 1.659 4.260 6.717 6.586 0.213
Min -0.977 -1.004 0.382 11.940 -0.029 0.000 0.000 -0.015 -0.080 0.000 1.820 2.650 5.290 0.000
Median 14.333 3.353 1.602 14.008 0.006 0.060 0.003 0.001 0.158 0.000 8.690 11.380 12.850 0.197
Max 166.296 6.066 3.810 21.427 0.142 0.672 0.092 0.053 0.977 38.330 83.010 150.550 150.610 1.137
Obs 3479 3479 3479 3479 3479 3479 3479 3479 3479 3479 3479 3479 3479 3154
Mean 5.405 3.194 -1.263 14.826 0.001 0.109 0.017 0.008 0.171 0.295 9.516 11.968 13.631 0.328
Std. Dev. 5.086 1.077 1.240 1.570 0.012 0.086 0.018 0.011 0.128 2.602 13.866 15.174 20.112 0.242
Min -2.730 -4.758 -3.072 12.321 -0.085 0.000 0.000 -0.006 -0.205 0.000 -3.510 -2.660 -2.660 0.000
Median 4.430 3.397 -0.877 14.402 0.003 0.089 0.011 0.004 0.146 0.002 8.860 10.930 12.500 0.272
Max 64.355 5.951 0.763 21.581 0.194 0.700 0.192 0.169 0.980 44.854 793.000 843.000 1155.000 1.935
Obs 4223 4223 4223 4223 4223 4223 4223 4223 4223 4223 4223 4223 4223 4024
Mean 10.753 3.536 -0.368 14.984 0.003 0.065 0.022 0.006 0.205 0.496 10.009 14.165 15.777 0.398
Std. Dev. 9.666 0.972 1.139 1.691 0.009 0.068 0.019 0.009 0.157 3.676 3.885 5.136 4.945 0.266
Min -1.417 -4.398 -2.755 12.473 -0.065 0.000 0.000 -0.024 -1.839 0.000 -0.240 -0.380 -0.380 0.000
Median 9.204 3.660 -0.691 14.525 0.003 0.047 0.017 0.004 0.181 0.007 9.580 13.410 15.040 0.379
Max 334.412 7.351 1.297 21.594 0.143 0.706 0.142 0.201 0.993 52.720 71.130 97.740 97.870 3.461
2010Q1 - 2013Q4
2003Q1 - 2013Q4
2003Q1 - 2007Q2
2007Q3 - 2009Q4
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(STWF), the non-performing loan ratio (NPLR), loan loss reserve ratio (LLRR) and institutional Shareholding (INST) are the seven control variables, in 
which STWF and NPLR show the BHC risk characteristics. The non-interest income ratio (NIN) and the off-balance-sheet activity risk ratio (OBSA) are 
the two alternative measures of BHC activity diversification. The Tier I risk-based capital ratio (Tier I), Total risk-based capital ratio (TRBCR), and Tier I 
leverage ratio (LEV) are the three alternative measures of capital requirements. All descriptive results are expressed in percentage, except Observations 
(Obs), DD, Z-Score and Size. 
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Table 3 Correlation between Variables during the Selected Full Period 
 
          Notes: This table shows correlation matrix of all dependent and independent variables for our selected BHCs during the period 2003Q1-2013Q4. The variable 
construction can be found in Table 1. The DD measure (DD) and the Z-Score measure (ZScore) are the two dependent variables. The housing price 
index (HPI), size (Size), return on assets (ROA), short-term wholesale funding (STWF), the non-performing loan ratio (NPLR), loan loss reserve ratio 
(LLRR) and institutional Shareholding (INST) are the seven control variables, in which STWF and NPLR show the BHC risk characteristics. The 
non-interest income ratio (NIN) and the off-balance-sheet activity risk ratio (OBSA) are the two alternative measures of BHC activity diversification. 
The Tier I risk-based capital ratio (Tier I), Total risk-based capital ratio (TRBCR), and Tier I leverage ratio (LEV) are the three alternative measures of 
capital requirements. 
 
DD ZScore HPI Size ROA STWF NPLR LLRR NIN OSBA T1Lev T1Cap TRBCR INST
DD 1.000
ZScore 0.104 1.000
HPI 0.385 0.034 1.000
Size -0.009 -0.033 -0.110 1.000
ROA 0.272 0.285 0.236 0.081 1.000
STWF -0.235 -0.096 -0.078 0.294 -0.037 1.000
NPLR -0.302 -0.263 -0.410 0.017 -0.395 -0.004 1.000
LLRR -0.259 -0.265 -0.346 0.108 -0.393 0.063 0.490 1.000
NIN 0.099 0.012 0.009 0.511 0.326 0.109 -0.118 -0.011 1.000
OSBA -0.037 0.030 -0.030 0.369 -0.001 0.209 -0.028 0.024 0.262 1.000
T1Lev 0.060 0.065 -0.017 -0.050 0.216 -0.074 -0.013 0.015 0.125 -0.035 1.000
T1Cap 0.085 0.099 -0.005 -0.059 0.257 -0.067 -0.032 -0.004 0.172 -0.011 0.952 1.000
TRBCR 0.064 0.072 -0.008 -0.010 0.205 -0.046 -0.016 0.008 0.157 0.003 0.970 0.983 1.000
INST -0.002 0.042 -0.152 0.693 0.064 0.179 0.020 0.099 0.363 0.147 0.032 0.035 0.051 1.000
Correlation Matrix
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Table 4 Multivariate Regression Results before the Financial Crisis 
Notes: This table shows the multivariate regression results by using the econometric equation (7) (random effects model with standard errors clustered on firm level) for         
the determinants of both the DD and Z-Score measures based on the selected BHCs before the crisis, i.e. 2003Q1-2007Q2. The variable construction can be found in Table 1. 
The DD measure (DD) and the Z-Score measure (ZScore) are the two dependent variables. The housing price index (HPI), size (Size), return on assets (ROA), short-term 
wholesale funding (STWF), the non-performing loan ratio (NPLR), and loan loss reserve ratio (LLRR) are the six control variables, in which STWF and NPLR show the 
Variable DD DD DD DD DD DD ZScore ZScore ZScore ZScore ZScore ZScore
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
HPI 0.667 0.663 0.663 0.665 0.660 0.659 0.059 0.058 0.058 0.060 0.059 0.059
[0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]***
Size 0.370 0.334 0.299 0.377 0.352 0.323 -0.024 -0.028 -0.030 -0.033 -0.037 -0.038
[0.024]** [0.043]** [0.065]* [0.012]** [0.019]** [0.029]** [0.094]* [0.046]** [0.032]** [0.010]*** [0.004]*** [0.003]***
ROA 86.475 90.535 92.268 88.517 93.105 95.151 1.460 1.808 1.926 0.654 1.046 1.170
[0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.534] [0.435] [0.406] [0.784] [0.656] [0.619]
STWF -28.544 -29.080 -29.053 -28.494 -29.029 -28.990 -0.507 -0.542 -0.540 -0.547 -0.572 -0.570
[0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.005]*** [0.003]*** [0.003]*** [0.006]*** [0.004]*** [0.004]***
NPLR -77.374 -77.907 -78.659 -76.970 -77.471 -78.251 -13.149 -13.241 -13.307 -13.290 -13.376 -13.427
[0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.005]*** [0.005]*** [0.005]*** [0.005]*** [0.005]*** [0.005]***
LLRR 7.257 7.717 6.981 7.028 7.484 6.698 6.972 6.921 6.867 7.102 7.014 6.959
[0.865] [0.857] [0.870] [0.869] [0.861] [0.876] [0.182] [0.182] [0.186] [0.173] [0.175] [0.178]
NIN 1.126 1.455 1.637    -0.550 -0.517 -0.505    
[0.554] [0.452] [0.399] [0.005]*** [0.008]*** [0.010]***
OSBA    0.109 0.108 0.107    -0.028 -0.027 -0.028
[0.385] [0.391] [0.392] [0.062]* [0.063]* [0.061]*
T1Lev 0.170   0.176   0.014   0.011   
[0.031]** [0.025]** [0.019]** [0.075]*
T1Cap  0.075   0.080   0.005   0.004  
[0.111] [0.087]* [0.155] [0.359]
TRBCR   0.061   0.066   0.004   0.003
[0.173] [0.135] [0.260] [0.497]
_cons 9.437 10.491 11.023 9.479 10.421 10.903 3.721 3.838 3.872 3.779 3.885 3.909
[0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]***
N 7801 7801 7801 7801 7801 7801 7801 7801 7801 7801 7801 7801
N of groups 567 567 567 567 567 567 567 567 567 567 567 567
within 0.031 0.030 0.030 0.031 0.030 0.030 0.052 0.048 0.048 0.053 0.049 0.049
between 0.175 0.178 0.177 0.174 0.177 0.176 0.111 0.116 0.114 0.056 0.062 0.061
overall 0.107 0.108 0.108 0.106 0.107 0.107 0.085 0.083 0.080 0.058 0.056 0.054
Wald chi2 244.43 234.68 236.29 240.82 231.65 233.26 539.82 536.87 536.33 541.72 540.34 540.81
Prob > chi2 [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]***
2003Q1 - 2007Q2
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BHC risk characteristics. The non-interest income ratio (NIN) and the off-balance-sheet activity risk ratio (OBSA) are the two alternative measures of BHC activity 
diversification. The Tier I risk-based capital ratio (Tier I), Total risk-based capital ratio (TRBCR), and Tier I leverage ratio (LEV) are the three alternative measures of capital 
requirements. *, ** and *** imply statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 5 Multivariate Regression Results during the Financial Crisis 
 
       Notes: This table shows the multivariate regression results by using the econometric equation (7) (random effects model with standard errors clustered on firm level) 
for the determinants of both the DD and Z-Score measures based on the selected BHCs during the crisis, i.e. 2007Q3-2009Q4. The variable construction can 
be found in Table 1. The DD measure (DD) and the Z-Score measure (ZScore) are the two dependent variables. The housing price index (HPI), size (Size), 
return on assets (ROA), short-term wholesale funding (STWF), the non-performing loan ratio (NPLR), and loan loss reserve ratio (LLRR) are the six 
control variables, in which STWF and NPLR show the BHC risk characteristics. The non-interest income ratio (NIN) and the off-balance-sheet activity risk 
ratio (OBSA) are the two alternative measures of BHC activity diversification. The Tier I risk-based capital ratio (Tier I), Total risk-based capital ratio 
Variable DD DD DD DD DD DD ZScore ZScore ZScore ZScore ZScore ZScore
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
HPI 0.126 0.126 0.126 0.131 0.130 0.131 0.026 0.026 0.026 0.027 0.027 0.027
[0.022]** [0.023]** [0.022]** [0.018]** [0.019]** [0.018]** [0.096]* [0.094]* [0.096]* [0.103] [0.100]* [0.103]
Size -0.449 -0.446 -0.449 -0.215 -0.213 -0.216 0.031 0.031 0.031 -0.029 -0.029 -0.029
[0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.051]* [0.053]* [0.050]** [0.220] [0.222] [0.220] [0.169] [0.165] [0.172]
ROA 38.019 38.040 38.077 47.978 47.988 48.058 49.354 49.376 49.361 47.173 47.203 47.177
[0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]***
STWF -11.319 -11.320 -11.323 -11.723 -11.726 -11.729 -0.638 -0.638 -0.638 -0.558 -0.559 -0.558
[0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.069]* [0.068]* [0.068]* [0.116] [0.116] [0.116]
NPLR -49.113 -49.061 -49.140 -49.921 -49.878 -49.966 -16.508 -16.518 -16.511 -16.000 -16.015 -16.003
[0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]***
LLRR 27.983 27.824 27.939 32.735 32.551 32.695 -0.676 -0.647 -0.659 -1.533 -1.501 -1.520
[0.014]** [0.015]** [0.014]** [0.006]*** [0.006]*** [0.006]*** [0.915] [0.918] [0.917] [0.817] [0.819] [0.818]
NIN 7.063 7.031 7.057    -1.369 -1.364 -1.367    
[0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]***
OSBA    0.051 0.051 0.051    0.010 0.010 0.010
[0.106] [0.108] [0.108] [0.522] [0.517] [0.518]
T1Lev 0.004   0.005   -0.001   -0.001   
[0.033]** [0.087]* [0.224] [0.203]
T1Cap  0.005   0.006   -0.001   -0.001  
[0.092]* [0.140] [0.302] [0.253]
TRBCR   0.003   0.003   -0.001   -0.001
[0.043]** [0.091]* [0.140] [0.135]
_cons 15.007 14.948 15.013 12.586 12.525 12.590 3.205 3.210 3.204 3.891 3.897 3.889
[0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]***
N 3479 3479 3479 3479 3479 3479 3479 3479 3479 3479 3479 3479
N of groups 418 418 418 418 418 418 418 418 418 418 418 418
within 0.222 0.222 0.222 0.216 0.216 0.216 0.312 0.312 0.312 0.313 0.313 0.313
between 0.277 0.279 0.278 0.285 0.288 0.286 0.332 0.332 0.332 0.294 0.294 0.294
overall 0.252 0.253 0.253 0.241 0.242 0.241 0.299 0.300 0.299 0.279 0.280 0.280
Wald chi2 590.25 581.04 582.56 560.40 551.37 552.78 492.02 495.24 499.97 508.89 471.37 472.41
Prob > chi2 [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]***
2007Q3 - 2009Q4
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(TRBCR), and Tier I leverage ratio (LEV) are the three alternative measures of capital requirements. *, ** and *** imply statistical significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 6 Multivariate Regression Results after the Financial Crisis 
 
   Notes: This table shows the multivariate regression results by using the econometric equation (7) (random effects model with standard errors clustered on firm level) for 
the determinants of both the DD and Z-Score measures based on the selected BHCs after the crisis, i.e. 2010Q1-2013Q4. The variable construction can be found 
in Table 1. The DD measure (DD) and the Z-Score measure (ZScore) are the two dependent variables. The housing price index (HPI), size (Size), return on 
Variable DD DD DD DD DD DD ZScore ZScore ZScore ZScore ZScore ZScore
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
HPI 0.199 0.183 0.189 0.197 0.181 0.187 0.072 0.069 0.070 0.073 0.070 0.071
[0.060]* [0.087]* [0.075]* [0.061]* [0.088]* [0.076]* [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]***
Size 0.807 0.798 0.729 0.985 0.996 0.934 0.037 0.036 0.026 0.011 0.013 0.005
[0.000]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.198] [0.176] [0.315] [0.696] [0.622] [0.860]
ROA -7.572 3.567 6.303 -5.484 5.163 8.161 20.310 21.936 22.240 18.868 20.395 20.702
[0.742] [0.854] [0.751] [0.800] [0.769] [0.649] [0.001]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.001]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]***
STWF -11.730 -13.203 -13.247 -11.297 -12.658 -12.695 -0.681 -0.867 -0.861 -0.671 -0.842 -0.834
[0.001]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.001]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.140] [0.047]** [0.048]** [0.150] [0.055]* [0.058]*
NPLR -44.428 -44.803 -47.136 -45.422 -45.894 -48.251 -11.416 -11.503 -11.765 -11.335 -11.442 -11.703
[0.032]** [0.028]** [0.023]** [0.028]** [0.024]** [0.020]** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]***
LLRR -51.629 -47.440 -47.775 -51.740 -47.696 -48.014 -4.591 -3.938 -4.028 -4.722 -4.102 -4.191
[0.003]*** [0.009]*** [0.007]*** [0.003]*** [0.008]*** [0.006]*** [0.129] [0.182] [0.168] [0.113] [0.159] [0.147]
NIN 0.907 0.818 0.905    -0.486 -0.499 -0.495    
[0.603] [0.651] [0.615] [0.053]* [0.043]** [0.046]**
OSBA    -0.173 -0.203 -0.207    0.006 0.002 0.002
[0.002]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.352] [0.716] [0.810]
T1Lev 0.474   0.476   0.076   0.075   
[0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.004]*** [0.005]***
T1Cap  0.340   0.344   0.055   0.054  
[0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]***
TRBCR   0.315   0.319   0.055   0.054
[0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]***
_cons -5.406 -5.199 -4.335 -7.825 -7.968 -7.188 2.584 2.598 2.660 2.883 2.857 2.905
[0.140] [0.184] [0.260] [0.024]** [0.032]** [0.048]** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]***
N 4223 4223 4223 4223 4223 4223 4223 4223 4223 4223 4223 4223
N of groups 370 370 370 370 370 370 370 370 370 370 370 370
within 0.166 0.164 0.163 0.166 0.163 0.162 0.165 0.168 0.167 0.163 0.166 0.164
between 0.196 0.250 0.245 0.201 0.258 0.253 0.317 0.362 0.361 0.312 0.357 0.356
overall 0.189 0.207 0.203 0.195 0.215 0.211 0.152 0.177 0.177 0.149 0.173 0.173
Wald chi2 727.99 699.08 696.11 717.55 691.05 689.76 348.11 353.83 357.59 343.67 349.08 352.21
Prob > chi2 [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]***
2010Q1 - 2013Q4
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assets (ROA), short-term wholesale funding (STWF), the non-performing loan ratio (NPLR), and loan loss reserve ratio (LLRR) are the six control variables, in 
which STWF and NPLR show the BHC risk characteristics. The non-interest income ratio (NIN) and the off-balance-sheet activity risk ratio (OBSA) are the two 
alternative measures of BHC activity diversification. The Tier I risk-based capital ratio (Tier I), Total risk-based capital ratio (TRBCR), and Tier I leverage ratio 
(LEV) are the three alternative measures of capital requirements. *, ** and *** imply statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 7 Additional Analysis Results before the Financial Crisis
 
      Notes: This table shows additional analysis results after adding the institutional ownership variable into the econometric model (7) using random effects model with 
standard errors clustered on firm level for the determinants of both the DD and Z-Score measures based on the selected BHCs before the crisis, i.e. 
2003Q1-2007Q2. The variable construction can be found in Table 1. The DD measure (DD) and the Z-Score measure (ZScore) are the two dependent 
Variable DD DD DD DD DD DD ZScore ZScore ZScore ZScore ZScore ZScore
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
HPI 0.585 0.580 0.578 0.582 0.576 0.574 0.055 0.054 0.054 0.055 0.055 0.055
[0.001]*** [0.002]*** [0.002]*** [0.002]*** [0.002]*** [0.002]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]***
Size 0.597 0.540 0.510 0.636 0.592 0.568 -0.024 -0.028 -0.030 -0.036 -0.040 -0.041
[0.006]*** [0.014]** [0.019]** [0.002]*** [0.004]*** [0.006]*** [0.207] [0.137] [0.111] [0.040]** [0.020]** [0.016]**
ROA 101.973 107.113 109.391 103.505 109.186 111.767 3.253 3.460 3.562 2.591 2.826 2.937
[0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.178] [0.146] [0.134] [0.289] [0.239] [0.220]
STWF -28.636 -29.045 -29.098 -28.511 -28.893 -28.920 -0.577 -0.603 -0.604 -0.628 -0.648 -0.648
[0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.001]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]***
NPLR -72.354 -71.429 -71.718 -72.333 -71.311 -71.614 -8.917 -8.802 -8.841 -8.973 -8.871 -8.903
[0.044]** [0.048]** [0.047]** [0.044]** [0.048]** [0.048]** [0.083]* [0.088]* [0.087]* [0.082]* [0.086]* [0.085]*
LLRR 19.005 18.386 17.679 18.613 17.915 17.126 3.957 3.888 3.856 4.158 4.061 4.031
[0.689] [0.700] [0.712] [0.695] [0.708] [0.721] [0.439] [0.444] [0.449] [0.417] [0.425] [0.429]
NIN 1.049 1.434 1.641    -0.474 -0.456 -0.449    
[0.628] [0.515] [0.458] [0.039]** [0.046]** [0.052]*
OSBA    -0.007 -0.006 -0.006    -0.014 -0.013 -0.013
[0.900] [0.922] [0.925] [0.082]* [0.102] [0.096]*
T1Lev 0.114   0.119   0.010   0.009   
[0.081]* [0.063]* [0.040]** [0.127]
T1Cap  0.032   0.036   0.004   0.003  
[0.375] [0.295] [0.227] [0.455]
TRBCR   0.015   0.020   0.003   0.002
[0.670] [0.549] [0.293] [0.552]
INST -2.539 -2.347 -2.258 -2.537 -2.344 -2.254 -0.032 -0.018 -0.014 -0.038 -0.024 -0.020
[0.102] [0.132] [0.148] [0.103] [0.134] [0.150] [0.766] [0.865] [0.894] [0.724] [0.826] [0.852]
_cons 7.185 8.498 9.066 6.786 7.972 8.479 3.727 3.824 3.850 3.825 3.923 3.942
[0.018]** [0.005]*** [0.002]*** [0.022]** [0.007]*** [0.003]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]***
N 6721 6721 6721 6721 6721 6721 6721 6721 6721 6721 6721 6721
N of groups 504 504 504 504 504 504 504 504 504 504 504 504
within 0.030 0.029 0.029 0.030 0.029 0.029 0.041 0.039 0.039 0.041 0.039 0.039
between 0.159 0.164 0.167 0.159 0.164 0.167 0.080 0.077 0.075 0.050 0.049 0.048
overall 0.104 0.105 0.105 0.103 0.104 0.104 0.062 0.059 0.057 0.044 0.043 0.041
Wald chi2 191.96 190.01 192.45 190.53 188.69 191.23 455.32 456.64 457.06 447.99 451.46 452.80
Prob > chi2 [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]***
2003Q1 - 2007Q2
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variables. The housing price index (HPI), size (Size), return on assets (ROA), short-term wholesale funding (STWF), the non-performing loan ratio (NPLR), 
loan loss reserve ratio (LLRR) and institutional Shareholding (INST) are the seven control variables, in which STWF and NPLR show the BHC risk 
characteristics. The non-interest income ratio (NIN) and the off-balance-sheet activity risk ratio (OBSA) are the two alternative measures of BHC activity 
diversification. The Tier I risk-based capital ratio (Tier I), Total risk-based capital ratio (TRBCR), and Tier I leverage ratio (LEV) are the three alternative 
measures of capital requirements. *, ** and *** imply statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
39 
 
Table 8 Additional Analysis Results during the Financial Crisis 
 
   Notes: This table shows additional analysis results after adding the institutional ownership variable into the econometric model (7) using random effects model with 
standard errors clustered on firm level for the determinants of both the DD and Z-Score measures based on the selected BHCs during the crisis, i.e. 
2007Q3-2009Q4. The variable construction can be found in Table 1. The DD measure (DD) and the Z-Score measure (ZScore) are the two dependent variables. 
Variable DD DD DD DD DD DD ZScore ZScore ZScore ZScore ZScore ZScore
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
HPI 0.110 0.110 0.110 0.117 0.116 0.117 0.029 0.029 0.029 0.029 0.029 0.029
[0.060]* [0.061]* [0.060]* [0.048]** [0.049]** [0.047]** [0.087]* [0.085]* [0.087]* [0.102] [0.100]* [0.102]
Size -0.698 -0.694 -0.698 -0.479 -0.475 -0.479 -0.042 -0.042 -0.042 -0.123 -0.124 -0.123
[0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.001]*** [0.002]*** [0.001]*** [0.232] [0.227] [0.233] [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]***
ROA 36.594 36.600 36.639 47.004 46.999 47.069 48.281 48.304 48.287 45.702 45.744 45.710
[0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]***
STWF -12.050 -12.053 -12.054 -12.343 -12.348 -12.349 -0.516 -0.517 -0.516 -0.458 -0.460 -0.458
[0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.186] [0.185] [0.185] [0.256] [0.254] [0.255]
NPLR -49.682 -49.639 -49.703 -50.368 -50.332 -50.406 -15.808 -15.818 -15.810 -15.116 -15.135 -15.120
[0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]***
LLRR 24.750 24.628 24.717 29.749 29.606 29.722 -0.940 -0.911 -0.925 -2.066 -2.025 -2.051
[0.042]** [0.043]** [0.042]** [0.020]** [0.020]** [0.020]** [0.887] [0.890] [0.889] [0.766] [0.770] [0.768]
NIN 7.383 7.356 7.378    -1.568 -1.562 -1.566    
[0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]***
OSBA    0.070 0.069 0.070    0.016 0.016 0.016
[0.032]** [0.032]** [0.032]** [0.325] [0.321] [0.322]
T1Lev 0.004   0.004   -0.001   -0.001   
[0.019]** [0.080]* [0.108] [0.115]
T1Cap  0.005   0.005   -0.001   -0.001  
[0.077]* [0.135] [0.172] [0.162]
TRBCR   0.003   0.003   -0.001   -0.001
[0.032]** [0.085]* [0.059]* [0.075]*
INST 2.412 2.396 2.409 2.689 2.669 2.686 0.820 0.821 0.820 0.864 0.866 0.864
[0.003]*** [0.003]*** [0.003]*** [0.002]*** [0.002]*** [0.002]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]***
_cons 17.973 17.906 17.977 15.717 15.642 15.719 4.051 4.059 4.051 5.002 5.012 5.001
[0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]***
N 3154 3154 3154 3154 3154 3154 3154 3154 3154 3154 3154 3154
N of groups 382 382 382 382 382 382 382 382 382 382 382 382
within 0.213 0.213 0.213 0.208 0.208 0.208 0.306 0.306 0.306 0.308 0.308 0.308
between 0.280 0.282 0.281 0.286 0.289 0.287 0.259 0.258 0.258 0.221 0.221 0.221
overall 0.244 0.245 0.244 0.231 0.232 0.232 0.265 0.265 0.265 0.240 0.240 0.240
Wald chi2 515.41 504.31 505.62 498.78 489.73 491.06 506.72 498.03 505.78 490.83 423.92 426.97
Prob > chi2 [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]***
2007Q3 - 2009Q4
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The housing price index (HPI), size (Size), return on assets (ROA), short-term wholesale funding (STWF), the non-performing loan ratio (NPLR), loan loss 
reserve ratio (LLRR) and institutional Shareholding (INST) are the seven control variables, in which STWF and NPLR show the BHC risk characteristics. The 
non-interest income ratio (NIN) and the off-balance-sheet activity risk ratio (OBSA) are the two alternative measures of BHC activity diversification. The Tier I 
risk-based capital ratio (Tier I), Total risk-based capital ratio (TRBCR), and Tier I leverage ratio (LEV) are the three alternative measures of capital requirements. 
*, ** and *** imply statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 9 Additional Analysis Results after the Financial Crisis 
 
Notes: This table shows additional analysis results after adding the institutional ownership variable into the econometric model (7) using random effects model with standard 
errors clustered on firm level for the determinants of both the DD and Z-Score measures based on the selected BHCs after the crisis, i.e. 2010Q1-2013Q4. The variable 
construction can be found in Table 1. The DD measure (DD) and the Z-Score measure (ZScore) are the two dependent variables. The housing price index (HPI), size (Size), 
Variable DD DD DD DD DD DD ZScore ZScore ZScore ZScore ZScore ZScore
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
HPI 0.205 0.191 0.194 0.203 0.189 0.193 0.073 0.071 0.071 0.074 0.072 0.073
[0.028]** [0.045]** [0.039]** [0.028]** [0.044]** [0.038]** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]***
Size 1.361 1.353 1.278 1.583 1.598 1.529 0.055 0.058 0.049 0.027 0.032 0.024
[0.041]** [0.045]** [0.053]* [0.020]** [0.021]** [0.024]** [0.158] [0.102] [0.154] [0.511] [0.405] [0.516]
ROA -9.404 1.601 3.700 -7.962 2.338 4.741 19.389 20.792 21.035 17.591 18.836 19.076
[0.712] [0.944] [0.873] [0.734] [0.907] [0.816] [0.001]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.002]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]***
STWF -13.122 -13.833 -13.945 -12.531 -13.093 -13.198 -0.428 -0.483 -0.482 -0.401 -0.442 -0.440
[0.002]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.003]*** [0.002]*** [0.002]*** [0.349] [0.273] [0.275] [0.384] [0.321] [0.325]
NPLR -34.968 -35.739 -37.017 -36.173 -37.018 -38.329 -10.008 -10.084 -10.211 -9.851 -9.936 -10.062
[0.025]** [0.020]** [0.016]** [0.021]** [0.016]** [0.013]** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]***
LLRR -48.400 -44.080 -44.651 -48.503 -44.312 -44.850 -6.067 -5.449 -5.536 -6.293 -5.718 -5.803
[0.008]*** [0.021]** [0.017]** [0.008]*** [0.020]** [0.016]** [0.056]* [0.084]* [0.077]* [0.042]** [0.065]* [0.058]*
NIN 0.767 0.594 0.692    -0.624 -0.653 -0.650    
[0.729] [0.796] [0.763] [0.021]** [0.014]** [0.014]**
OSBA    -0.210 -0.242 -0.244    0.001 -0.002 -0.003
[0.008]*** [0.004]*** [0.004]*** [0.836] [0.739] [0.656]
T1Lev 0.431   0.433   0.061   0.059   
[0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.011]** [0.017]**
T1Cap  0.319   0.324   0.047   0.045  
[0.003]*** [0.003]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]***
TRBCR   0.294   0.300   0.046   0.045
[0.005]*** [0.004]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]***
INST -5.289 -5.289 -5.175 -5.467 -5.506 -5.399 -0.097 -0.125 -0.120 -0.087 -0.116 -0.112
[0.284] [0.287] [0.295] [0.273] [0.272] [0.279] [0.686] [0.581] [0.598] [0.721] [0.613] [0.628]
_cons -11.194 -11.167 -10.218 -14.225 -14.604 -13.740 2.523 2.450 2.508 2.839 2.734 2.780
[0.204] [0.225] [0.259] [0.118] [0.125] [0.143] [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]***
N 4024 4024 4024 4024 4024 4024 4024 4024 4024 4024 4024 4024
N of groups 359 359 359 359 359 359 359 359 359 359 359 359
within 0.160 0.157 0.157 0.159 0.157 0.157 0.124 0.128 0.127 0.121 0.124 0.124
between 0.157 0.209 0.201 0.167 0.223 0.214 0.307 0.346 0.346 0.299 0.338 0.338
overall 0.149 0.164 0.159 0.156 0.175 0.169 0.130 0.150 0.150 0.125 0.143 0.142
Wald chi2 741.31 686.14 683.76 741.70 686.20 685.83 331.19 336.14 337.32 308.75 311.37 314.07
Prob > chi2 [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]***
2010Q1 - 2013Q4
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return on assets (ROA), short-term wholesale funding (STWF), the non-performing loan ratio (NPLR), loan loss reserve ratio (LLRR) and institutional Shareholding (INST) 
are the seven control variables, in which STWF and NPLR show the BHC risk characteristics. The non-interest income ratio (NIN) and the off-balance-sheet activity risk 
ratio (OBSA) are the two alternative measures of BHC activity diversification. The Tier I risk-based capital ratio (Tier I), Total risk-based capital ratio (TRBCR), and Tier I 
leverage ratio (LEV) are the three alternative measures of capital requirements. *, ** and *** imply statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
